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THE PRESIDENT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

Mark Tushnet*

INTRODUCTION: SOME GROUNDWORK
Departmentalist constitutional theory asserts that members of each branch have
the authority to use their own understandings of the Constitution when they act within
their prescribed domain.1 Specifically, departmentalists claim that neither the President
nor members of Congress are required to accept the interpretations of the Constitution
offered by the courts, either in evaluating possible courses of action beforehand or
bowing to a judicial decision after the event as a matter of principle.2 Sometimes
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School. I thank
Martin Lederman, Louis M. Seidman, and Eric Segall for extremely valuable comments on
a draft of this Article.
1
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law
in a Populist Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487, 489 (2018).
2
Many departmentalists believe that in the vast majority of circumstances there will be
good prudential reasons to accede to a judicial interpretation after the event, although the
conditions for acceding can be quite narrow. See id. at 507. The classic statement is Abraham
Lincoln’s—that he would defer to a judicial interpretation with respect to the very case in
which it was rendered but need not take that interpretation as a rule to guide future action in
developing policy:
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional
questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that
such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as
to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect
and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the
Government. And while it is obviously possible that such decision may
be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being
limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled
and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than
could the evils of a different practice. At the same time, the candid citizen
must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between
parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into
the hands of that eminent tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault
upon the court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink
to decide cases properly brought before them, and it is no fault of theirs
if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes.
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861) (transcript available at https://ava
lon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp [https://perma.cc/C4H5-LBJ8]).
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departmentalists confine their claims to constitutional interpretation of provisions
about each department’s scope of authority.3 So, for example, a departmentalist president might claim that Article II gives her the power to remove at will any principal
officer of the government from office even though Congress has purported to limit
the removal power in ways that seem consistent with Supreme Court precedent.4
Individual rights cut across all three branches.5 Assume that Congress is exercising
one of its enumerated powers. All agree that Congress can provide legal rights associated with, for example, freedom of expression or racial equality that are more extensive
than the rights the Supreme Court would hold—or indeed has held—the Constitution
itself generates.6 Note the formulation here: “legal rights” and “associated with”
constitutional rights–provisions. For present purposes, I mean by “legal” rights those
that can be enforced in court.7 That a right is associated with a constitutional provision
means (a) that it is not something the courts would find required by the Constitution
itself,8 (b) that it advances the values underlying the judicially enforced right, and (c)
that the associated right falls within a range of reasonable interpretation of some constitutional provision even though the courts have adopted a different interpretation.9
With the notions of “legal rights” “associated with” constitutional rights in hand,
what can be said about the President and individual rights? This Article divides the
3

See Matthew Steilen, Collaborative Departmentalism, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 345, 355 (2013).
See id. at 346–47.
5
See Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE. L.J. 346, 380, 384–86 (2016) (discussing separation of powers among the
three branches).
6
See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa–2000aa-12 (with
respect to freedom of expression); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (with respect to racial equality).
7
See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (outlining a distinction between enforced
and unenforced constitutional norms).
8
For purposes of this Article I put to one side two situations: (1) The possibility that people
can have legal rights even when no institutional actors do anything to respect those rights (such
as protecting or acknowledging them) is largely irrelevant to the kinds of institutional issues
of interest to departmentalists and judicial supremacists; and (2) this Article does not discuss
cases where Congress has adopted a remedy for constitutional violations by state actors that the
courts would themselves recognize but that goes somewhat beyond what the courts would do
because the courts lack the institutional capacity to develop fully adequate remedies. See id. at
1217–18. A nationally applicable rule that certain changes in voting procedures must be preapproved by a national body is an example (not foreclosed by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529 (2013)). Cf. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–702. Similarly, this Article
does not discuss cases where Congress has adopted a modestly prophylactic interpretation of the
(judicially defined) constitutional right because the prophylactic rule is congruent with and
proportional to the degree of judicially recognizable constitutional violations. See, e.g., City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529–30 (1997). This doctrine means that some actions by states
and their officials would be such that (a) the courts would not hold them unconstitutional, but
that (b) the courts would hold them to be violations of a constitutionally permissible statute.
9
See Sager, supra note 7, at 1243–45.
4
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discussion into two parts. Part I deals with a president’s exercise of discretionary powers, such as the power to pardon, the power to veto bills that reach her desk, and the
power to recommend legislation.10 It argues that, though the president of course can
take into account the values associated with individual-rights-oriented constitutional
provisions in exercising these discretionary powers, the very fact that they are discretionary means that they do not involve the president in protecting individual rights.
Part II turns to the President’s power to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed by supervising the actions of her appointees to Cabinet and other administrative positions.11 Section A lays out standard departmentalist arguments that the
take-care obligation does not require that the President’s supervision be determined
in principle by judicial interpretations of the Constitution’s individual rights provisions.12 It examines what has come to be called administrative constitutionalism to
show that presidents can exercise their take-care obligation by providing either
“more” or “less” protection for individual rights than the courts have or would (the
scare quotes indicating that the characterization of something as more protective or
less so itself rests upon prior agreement about the right’s scope).
Section B then turns to the case where the President and her appointees agree
with the courts about the content of an individual right.13 Administrative constitutionalism in this mode means that executive officials act within their jurisdiction to protect
the legal rights the courts would recognize.14 It retrieves an argument made decades
ago by Bernard Meltzer, that a world with more remedies for the same rights violations might not be better—from a rights-protective point of view—than a world
with fewer such remedies.15
A brief Conclusion summarizes the argument.16
I. THE PRESIDENT’S DISCRETIONARY POWERS
One standard example offered in defense of departmentalism is President Thomas
Jefferson’s decision to pardon those who had been convicted of violating the
Federalist-inspired Sedition Act of 1798.17 Jefferson did so because he believed that the
Sedition Act was unconstitutional on federalism and freedom-of-expression grounds.18
10

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
12
See infra Section II.A.
13
See infra Section II.B.
14
See infra notes 68–77 and accompanying text.
15
See Bernard D. Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination:
The More Remedies, the Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1974).
16
See infra Conclusion.
17
See JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 231 (1951)
(“[Jefferson] pardoned all still serving terms for violating the Sedition Act, declaring that he
considered that law ‘to be nullity as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us
to fall down and worship a golden image.’”).
18
Jefferson prepared but did not send a message to the Senate explaining his position, which
11
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And he did so in the face of lower court decisions upholding the statute against
constitutional challenges.19 Another standard example is President Andrew Jackson’s
veto of a bill rechartering the Bank of the United States.20 Jackson’s veto invoked
policy and constitutional (federalism) objections to the rechartering.21 Notably, the Supreme Court here had rejected the constitutional challenges.22 Finally, presidents can
recommend that Congress enact a statute providing more protection to individual
privacy from government surveillance than the Supreme Court has or would hold
constitutionally guaranteed.23
These three examples involve exercises of discretionary presidential powers.24
The key point about discretionary decisions is that before, and sometimes even after,
they are made they necessarily create no legal rights.25 No one convicted of violating
referred to the “protection” the Constitution “secure[d] to the press . . . in which it remained
under the authority of the states, with whom alone the power is left of abridging that freedom.”
JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 305 (1956).
19
The Supreme Court had not resolved the question largely because it had limited jurisdiction in criminal cases. See Charles E. Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction,
27 VILL. L. REV. 959, 964 (1982). For a discussion of the possibility that a President would
grant a pardon to someone convicted of violating court-determined constitutional rights of other
people because the President believed that the person receiving the pardon had not violated
such rights before they were exercised, see infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
20
Veto Message from Andrew Jackson, President of the U.S., to the U.S. Senate (July 10,
1832) [hereinafter Veto Message], https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp [https://
perma.cc/FG2W-W7NX]. I note that the veto message can be read as Jackson’s interpretation
of McCulloch rather than as his disagreement with it. See David S. Schwartz, Defying
McCulloch? Jackson’s Bank Veto Reconsidered, 72 ARK.L.REV.129,132(2019). In this understanding, Jackson read McCulloch as holding that the degree of necessity was for elected officials
to decide. Those officials decided in 1816 that the bank was necessary in the constitutional sense,
and Jackson was deciding in 1832 that it was not necessary in that sense. See Mark A. Graber,
Overruling McCulloch?, 72 ARK. L. REV. 79, 82 (2019). I thank Mark Graber for pointing
out this reading of Jackson’s message.
21
See Veto Message, supra note 20.
22
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326–27 (1819).
23
See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL
DIGITAL ECONOMY 35–40 (2012).
24
See Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 1551, 1595–96 (2011).
25
Legal rights might arise after a discretionary decision is made. See Comment, Presidential
Clemency and the Restoration of Civil Rights: Appraising the Consequences of a Full Article II
Pardon, 61 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1430–31 (1976). For example, a person who had received
a pardon would not be reimprisoned for the underlying offense if a successor President believed
the pardon to rest on a mistaken understanding of the Constitution. Id. at 1427–28. Not all such
discretionary decisions have this character, though: a discretionary decision to recommend
legislation creates no legal rights even after it is made. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2127–28 (1989).
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the Sedition Act had a right to a pardon—even in the form of a right to have a President
who believes the Act unconstitutional issue a pardon.26 Or consider United States
v. Lovett.27 There Congress had directed the President to withhold pay from three
named government officials.28 President Franklin Roosevelt signed the bill, stating,
“I have been forced to yield, to avoid delaying our conduct of the war. But I cannot
so yield without placing on record my view that this provision is not only unwise
and discriminatory, but unconstitutional.”29 The Supreme Court did hold the statute
unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.30 Even so, Lovett clearly had no legal right to
a veto from a President who believed the statute unconstitutional.31
All this is so elementary as perhaps not worth stating in detail. A President’s
discretionary powers in themselves cannot generate rights because, in Hohfeldian
terms, the putative rights-holder cannot assert that the President has a duty to use
those powers one way or another.32
Still, as the examples show, a President can exercise her discretionary powers
in ways that take into account values associated with individual rights.33 In doing so
she protects those values. There is one complication, though. Constitutional rights
either trump other non-rights social values, in Dworkin’s terms, or compete against
those other values.34 In the first case the contours of the constitutional right are defined
with reference to those other values.35 So, for example, the right to free expression
trumps the values of social stability, but the right does not encompass (in the United
States) utterances that (to oversimplify) are intended to and are likely to incite
imminent lawless action.36 In the second case, the values associated with the right
are balanced against other social values such as stability or, in the usual example,
the ability of people to use streets and parks for their ordinary purposes.37
26

Suppose, contrary to the fact, that the Sedition Act remained on the books after Jefferson
left the presidency and was replaced by a President who believed the Act constitutional. Had
Jefferson overlooked someone convicted of violating the Act, that person would have no claim
to a pardon from Jefferson’s successor. See Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 73, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
27
328 U.S. 303 (1946).
28
Id. at 304–05.
29
Id. at 313.
30
Id. at 316–18.
31
A strong adherent to judicial supremacy could challenge this entire line of argument by
denying that any decisions are discretionary—or, put another way, that all presidential decisions
(whether to issue or refrain from issuing a pardon, whether to veto or sign legislation) are subject to evaluation by the courts. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power
of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1313–14 (1996).
32
Though, again, once exercised some of the powers can generate legal rights.
33
See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
34
See François du Bois, Rights Trumped? Balancing in Constitutional Adjudication, 2004
ACTA JURIDICA 155, 162–63.
35
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
36
Id.
37
See du Bois, supra note 34, at 157.
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In either version, a President’s discretionary action that takes into account the
values associated with a constitutional right might bump up against other social
values.38 In the usual case this simply produces an ordinary policy judgment that, in
the policymaker’s view (here, the President’s), public policy is better advanced by
the decisionmaker’s preferred course of action.39 Sometimes, though, the other social
values are also associated with individual rights. In those cases the President’s discretionary decisions might violate one person’s constitutional rights while seeming
to protect another. This problem is pervasive in connection with the take-care obligation, as we will see in Part II, but almost non-existent with respect to the President’s
other discretionary powers.40 One can dream up extreme hypotheticals in which a
pardon based on a President’s view of the Constitution or even a constitutionally
based recommendation to Congress might violate someone’s constitutional rights.41
That the hypotheticals are extreme indicates that we should not build anything of
theoretical significance around them.
As noted, the problem that actions taken to advance values associated with individual rights can bump up against other social values is pervasive in connection with
the take-care obligation, to which this Article now turns.
II. THE TAKE-CARE OBLIGATION, DEPARTMENTALISM, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Departmentalism
One might initially think that a presidential decision to provide “more” protection than the Constitution requires could not violate the take-care obligation. After
38

See id. at 162–63.
See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
40
See infra Part II.
41
For example, a President might pardon all those convicted of the crime of possessing a
gun after having been convicted of a crime of domestic violence, taking the view that the
Second Amendment protects gun possession under all such circumstances. Doing so might
diminish the personal security of potential victims of domestic violence to the point that the
President’s action deprives them of life or liberty without due process of law. (This hypothetical
tracks the analysis one should offer on the question of whether President Trump’s pardon of
Joseph Arpaio might violate the constitutional rights of those whose rights Arpaio was found
by the courts to have violated. See, e.g., United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001-PHXSRB, 2017 WL 4839072, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2017), aff’d, 951 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir.
2020).) Or a recommendation that race-based affirmative action be outlawed, based upon a
President’s view of what the idea of equal protection requires, might unconstitutionally encourage discrimination against racial minorities. It is worth noting that both substantive claims
here are nonstandard, but are available within current constitutional discourse, and that the nonstandard nature of the constitutional analysis is what makes the hypotheticals extreme, not the
possibility that the hypotheticals might actually occur.
39
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all, if Congress can enact statutes that provide free expression rights broader than
the Supreme Court says the First Amendment requires, why cannot the President do
the same?42
Consider the following problems. During the Presidency of President A, Congress
enacts, and the President signs, a statute authorizing criminal prosecutions of those
who publish sensitive but non-classified material that deals with national security
matters. The President directs that the Department of Justice institute prosecutions
under the statute. One defendant challenges the statute as a First Amendment violation because it is unconstitutionally overbroad. The Supreme Court rejects the
challenge and holds the statute to be constitutionally permissible. Then President B
takes office. Believing that the statute is indeed unconstitutional, the President
directs that all pending prosecutions be dropped and that none be brought thereafter.
With the statute still on the books, and held to be constitutional by the Supreme
Court, has President B failed to take care that the laws be faithfully executed?43
Or consider a President who directs federal prosecutors not to use in any way
whatever information derived from questioning after imperfect or no Miranda44
warnings were given, even when precedent holds that the use of the information in
the circumstances would be constitutionally permissible. Of course, such a direction
ensures that the Fifth Amendment is faithfully executed. Perhaps, though, it violates
the Take Care Clause with respect to federal criminal laws, the enforcement of
which might be less effective than otherwise.45
42

I put to one side a case where the President waives a legal right available to her personally.
I see no difficulty with a presidential decision to refrain from suing for libel even when she
believes—and believes she can establish—that someone has published a false statement about
her with malice in the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan sense. See generally 376 U.S. 254
(1964). The reason, though, is that she has no constitutional duty to take care that libel law—
state law, after all—be faithfully enforced.
43
A somewhat more complicated case would arise were Congress to make it clear, either
with respect to a particular statute or with respect to criminal statutes generally, that it authorized
the President to make case-specific decisions about whether to prosecute but did not authorize
her to make categorical judgments like the one described in the text. The President would certainly contend that this directive itself violated her Article II inherent executive power. See
U.S. CONST. art. II. Suppose the courts rejected that contention. Then the President would rely
on the narrow departmentalist view that she has the power to determine the scope of the Constitution as it applies to her office. See infra text accompanying notes 46–53.
44
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45
I am inclined to think that it does not, even when the directive leads a prosecutor to
conclude that prosecution without the evidence would be futile. In my view, this would be akin
to situations in which policy considerations (the defendant’s age or ill health, for example)
lead prosecutors to decline to prosecute, see, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge
to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”), and such declinations pretty clearly do not violate the take-care duty. See id. Note, though, that the practice
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The departmentalist says that the President has not violated the take-care obligation
in either case. The reasons are simple.46 Most constitutional provisions identifying
individual rights do so at relatively high levels of abstraction: “[T]he freedom of
speech,” “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and the like.47 To become administrable law they have to be transformed into doctrines.48 I call these doctrines “specifications” of the terms’ meaning. Specifications are not, in general, merely the results
reached in specific cases or even the aggregate of such results.49 Rather, they are doctrinal formulations at a mid-level of abstraction. Examples from the First Amendment
are “clear and present danger,”50 “the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability,”51 “incitement to imminent lawless action.”52 Each specification might be said
to transform the abstract constitutional provisions into tools for effective governance, including effective rights-protection. Each rests upon a judgment about how
the values underlying the constitutional provision can best be implemented in a
complex government system.53
I pass over a large number of details about what goes into that judgment.54 The
central argument departmentalists make is that there are many reasonable specifications of individual provisions available in complex systems. Different decisionmakers can place different weights on the various considerations and arrive at
different bottom-line judgments, all of which are reasonable.55 They can agree that
of case-specific declinations might be different from a categorical decision to decline to
prosecute, as discussed supra note 43 and accompanying text.
46
I confine this discussion to the Constitution’s individual rights provisions, though in
my view the same arguments are available with respect to all the Constitution’s provisions.
47
See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV.
48
Cf. James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2005).
49
Sometimes they are, when the abstract constitutional term is specified by a doctrine
directing decisionmakers to take all relevant matters into account and from them determine
whether, all things considered, the constitutional right was violated. See, e.g., Kari M. Knudson,
Comment, Searches and Seizures—Automobile Exception: The Fourth Amendment Does Not
Prevent a Search of Passengers’ Containers in an Automobile: Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295 (1999), 76 N.D. L. REV. 943, 945–46 (2000) (discussing hierarchy of factors in
considering Fourth Amendment violations).
50
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
51
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
52
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
53
See Fleming, supra note 48, at 1381.
54
Among the considerations are: the number of officials charged with implementing the
doctrine as specified, federalism, the capacity of courts to supervise implementing officials, and
the capacity of higher courts to supervise lower courts. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional
Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2004, at 105, 109–10 (2004). There are, however, many
more considerations. See, e.g., id.
55
See Fallon, supra note 1, at 489–90.
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the Supreme Court’s specification of the First Amendment’s applicability to modes
of expression that take the form of nonverbal communication is reasonable,56 for
example, but also believe (reasonably) that the Court’s criteria for determining when
nonverbal communication is covered by the First Amendment—its specification of
the doctrine—include too many (or too few) forms of nonverbal communication.57
For the departmentalist, a court’s specification of constitutional doctrine is a datum
a President should take into account, but in the end, the departmentalist believes, the
President can make her own judgment about how the balance of considerations
comes out, within the broad constraints of reasonableness.58
To my mind, the only substantial objection to departmentalism defended in this
way is that it introduces an undesirable instability into the law.59 Perhaps some
instability can be productive, for example by allowing different actors to search for
specifications better than the ones the courts come up with. Even if that is not so,
though, the constraint that a President’s (or Congress’s) specification must be reasonable limits the instability. And, for the departmentalist, the instability is limited enough
to be tolerable.60
56

See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 406 (1989).
As did Judge Bork. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26–27 (1971).
58
Some departmentalists supplement this (in my opinion) modest argument with the argument that a presidential or congressional reasonable specification should prevail over a court’s
because the President and Congress have a democratic warrant for their judgments that the courts
lack (or have more indirectly). Fallon, supra note 1, at 488–89, 491–92 (presenting departmentalist arguments about a President’s ability to usurp judicial supremacy). That supplement is,
in my view, defensible, but it is not relevant to the argument of this Article.
59
See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359–60 (1997) (providing examples where independent actors’
decisions to bypass judicial supremacy could cause instability). Schauer and Alexander make
a broader jurisprudential argument, which is (as I understand it) that for an action to count as
law, it must displace the possibility that other actors would evaluate on their own the considerations underlying the action. See id. at 1361, 1371–72. On this view, departmentalism is
inconsistent with the idea that Supreme Court decisions are law. I am not competent to take
on that jurisprudential argument, though it seems to me to rest upon an overly strong account
of the degree to which actions must displace others’ judgment to count as law. See, e.g., id.
at 1373–74 (using precedent as an example of when judges must determine whether to displace
a prior judge’s judgment in order to craft new law).
For the departmentalist, the fact that the President’s interpretation is a reasonable one
(though different from the judiciary’s also reasonable one) defeats the general objection from
judicial expertise. There is a residual problem of motivation: suppose the President really
does not care about the Constitution but has her lawyers gin up a reasonable constitutional
interpretation that purports to justify an otherwise badly motivated action. My view is that,
if clearly established, such motivation would override the departmentalist defense of the President’s action. For a discussion that underlies that view, see Mark Tushnet, Trump v. Hawaii:
“This President” and the National Security Constitution, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1–2.
60
The preceding example suggests some difficulties associated with the language of
57
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Now consider a more realistic example.61 The President believes that Congress
and the courts have misinterpreted the Free Exercise Clause62—the courts by failing
to recognize a constitutionally rooted obligation to accommodate neutral laws of
general applicability to take account of their adverse impact on free exercise, and
Congress by purporting to require such accommodations under criteria that are less
robust than the President believes the Constitution requires (for example, by purporting to require that the accommodation be unavailable if there is merely a strong
government interest supporting the underlying statute rather than, as the President
believes, a compelling interest).63 The President therefore directs that relevant agencies
refrain from enforcing neutral nondiscrimination laws against participants in federal
programs who have religiously based objections to the duties imposed by those laws
because, in the President’s view, the underlying government interests are perhaps
strong but certainly not compelling.64
Here the problem is not one of “over”-protection of the free exercise right. It is
also one of “under”-protection of other constitutional rights, either the Nonestablishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause65—what I earlier referred to as the problem
arising when one constitutional right bumps up against another.66 The President must
make departmentalist arguments with respect to two (or three) constitutional provisions:
“under”- and “over”-enforcement. The President is under-enforcing a statute that, in the view
of Congress and the courts, fully protects individual rights, and in doing so over-enforces the
First Amendment, again in the view of the other branches.
61
The example is developed from Trump Administration policies with respect to the
enforcement of nondiscrimination obligations in many federal statutes. See, e.g., Exec. Order
No. 13,831, 83 Fed. Reg. 20,715 (May 3, 2018).
62
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
63
I am not here attempting to describe the existing statutory regime under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.
64
I have designed the hypothetical in a way that makes a statutory challenge to the President’s directive available as based upon an interpretation contrary to law, because in doing
so the President is requiring agencies to construe the congressional statute more expansively
than its terms require or allow. The hypothetical makes it possible for the President to claim that
her interpretation of the statute is permissible in light of the canon of constitutional avoidance
(where what is to be avoided is a constitutional problem arising from the President’s views
about the Constitution). See, e.g., Aneil Kovvali, Constitutional Avoidance and Presidential
Power, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. BULL. 10, 12 (2017).
65
Technically, the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66
The Trump Administration’s expansive interpretation of the exemption provided in the
Affordable Care Act for those who object to providing certain “essential” services might be said
to “over”-protect religious liberty but at the cost of underserving the Act’s goals and of arguably
“under”-protecting equality rights (though the latter claim is complicated by the fact that the
recipients of the services probably do not have a constitutional right, whether grounded in equality or due process, to receive the services). I thank Tara Leigh Grove for pressing me to use
this example.
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The President’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause must be within the range of
reasonable interpretations of that clause, and her interpretation of the Nonestablishment
and Equal Protection Clauses must be within the range of reasonable interpretations
of those clauses.67
B. Administrative Constitutionalism
Over the past decade scholars, mostly of legal history and administrative law,
have produced an interesting body of work on what they call “administrative constitutionalism.”68 Professor Karen Tani defines the term: “[T]he role of administrative
agencies in constructing and elaborating constitutional meaning.”69 According to
Professor Tani, the historically oriented scholars engaged in this project tend to focus
on “people whose low status or limited access to formal power may have prevented
them from ‘making history’ in the traditional sense.”70 Administrative constitutionalism
results from the interaction between agency employees, typically civil service bureaucrats today, and those low-status people—or, more generally, those who higher-level
officials see as the objects of regulation but who see themselves as active subjects.71
Professor Tani suggests that constitutional meanings constructed within administrative agencies have “two lines of influence,” one “[running] through Congress
and the other [running] through the judiciary.”72 The first line is one in which executive
departmentalism contributes to legislative departmentalism, the second is one in which
it informs constitutional interpretation in the courts. Note the temporal dimension
here.73 In this version, administrative constitutionalism operates on a nearly blank
slate.74 One of Professor Tani’s case studies, for example, involves the construction
of the idea of freedom or non-slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment prior to any
judicial definitions.75 Professor Sophia Lee’s study of administrative constitutionalism
in the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and
the National Labor Relations Board deals (in rough summary) with the application of
equality norms in new regulatory domains.76 From the point of view of constitutional
67

I take no position on the merits of these specific departmentalist arguments.
See, e.g., Karen M. Tani, Administrative Constitutionalism at the “Borders of Belonging”:
Drawing on History to Expand the Archive and Change the Lens, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1603,
1604–05 (2019).
69
Id. at 1604.
70
Id. at 1607–08.
71
Id. at 1607–08, 1628–30.
72
Id. at 1617.
73
See id. at 1617–18.
74
See id. at 1613, 1617–18.
75
See id. at 1611, 1619.
76
See Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and
the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 800–02 (2010). Qua legal norm, the
norm of sex equality was itself relatively novel when the agencies began to deal with it. See
id. at 838–39, 844.
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structure (as distinct from a point of view focusing on the substantive norm), administrative constitutionalism as a form of executive departmentalism raises no
normative questions because it does not place the executive branch at odds with either
Congress or the courts.77
For present purposes, cases where administrative constitutionalism deals with
constitutional norms on which the courts in particular have already weighed in is
more interesting. This Article focuses specifically on cases where the agency accepts
the norms as defined by the courts and tries to implement them.78 Sometimes this
creates problems of “over”-enforcement, as described above.79 Sometimes, though,
it creates a distinctive problem identified in 1974 by Professor Bernard Meltzer.80
Taking his cue from two then-recent court decisions requiring the National
Labor Relations Board to take racial discrimination by labor unions into account in
implementing its statutory obligations—and in particular in determining whether to
recognize a discriminatory union as a bargaining agent—Professor Meltzer questioned whether more remedies for acknowledged statutory and constitutional
violations are always better.81 As he wrote in his concluding sentence: “There is
little reason to believe that [additional remedies] will make an effective contribution
to eliminating racial discrimination; but there are good reasons for believing that they
77

See id. at 801–02.
Professor Lee provides a useful summary of late twentieth-century developments:
[W]hereas before they might have had no choice but to reason from
custom and constitutional first principles, the Court’s growing constitutional rights jurisprudence ensured that they had ample judicial sources
to which to turn. . . . The Court’s rights activism and assertions of judicial
supremacy gave administrators incentives to punt difficult constitutional
questions to courts. In constitutional disputes within agencies, administrators strategically invoked judicial supremacy and precedent to advance
their arguments.
Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the
Founding to the Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1699, 1743–44 (2019) (footnote omitted).
79
Professor Walker observes that “federal agencies regulate us in many meaningful, and
sometimes frightening, ways that either evade judicial review entirely or are at least substantially
insulated from such review.” Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law Without Courts, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1620, 1624 (2018). These methods include agency guidance and enforcement
discretion, informal and formal adjudication, rulemaking under Chevron, legislative drafting
assistance, and agency budgeting. Id. at 1625. Characterizing some of these as ways of regulating seems to me questionable (budgeting) or encapsulated by departmentalism as already
discussed (enforcement discretion and drafting assistance). In my view, to the extent that the
current absence or difficulty of judicial review is a problem, it is one that can be remedied
through adjustments in nonconstitutional law (modifying Chevron and treating the more stringent
forms of guidance as having force of law, for example). For that reason, the problem of judicial
review, if there is one, does not raise the kinds of questions about constitutional fundamentals
with which this Article is concerned.
80
See Meltzer, supra note 15, at 3, 44–45.
81
Id. at 2–3.
78
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will compromise the purposes of the NLRA, which are valued by the historic victims
of racial discrimination . . . .”82 This concern arises not only when courts direct that the
NLRB take race discrimination into account in a specific way, but also when the
agency on its own initiative does so.83 That is, it is a concern associated with administrative constitutionalism.84
Professor Meltzer’s analysis was NLRA-specific, but that specificity rested upon
more general concerns.85 Professor Meltzer observed that the NLRA was only one
of several statutes that addressed, or could be interpreted to address, racial discrimination in employment.86 Each statute provided different remedies for such discrimination.87 Professor Meltzer argued that we should see the statutes and their remedies
as part of an integrated system of governance, and our concern should be with ensuring
that that system, taken as a whole, provided effective remedies for racial discrimination.88 Examining the statutes applicable to racial discrimination in employment,
Professor Meltzer concluded that the remedies under the NLRA were likely to be
less effective than remedies available under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and might even undermine those remedies.89 This concern will arise throughout the
domain of administrative constitutionalism whenever—as will almost always be the
case—constitutional concerns can be raised in multiple institutional locations.90
The problem described earlier of administrative constitutionalism bumping up
against other values also concerned Professor Meltzer, again for reasons arising from
institutional arrangements.91 Earlier I discussed the way in which agency implementation of values associated with constitutional rights might bump up against other
values.92 Here we are concerned with the constitutional rights themselves; that is, the
substantive rights are precisely those that courts would enforce.93 Professor Meltzer
argued that NLRB enforcement of antidiscrimination norms through its remedial
system would weaken the Board’s ability to achieve its statutory goal of promoting
industrial peace.94 Here administrative constitutionalism interferes with the (merely?)
82

Id. at 46.
See id. at 45.
84
See id. at 19–21.
85
See id. at 45–46.
86
Id. at 1.
87
See id.
88
See, e.g., id. at 45 (referring to “the different parts of the administrative-judicial system”
with “distinctive responsibilities” (emphasis added)).
89
See id. at 17 (referring to the problem of “determining the effect that NLRB decisions
should have in actions filed under Title VII”).
90
See id. at 45–46.
91
See id. at 15.
92
See supra Part II.
93
See Meltzer, supra note 15, at 32.
94
Id. at 14–15.
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statutory charge the agency has received from Congress.95 And, for Professor Meltzer,
such interference was unnecessary because other statutes provided remedies that could
be implemented without weakening the NLRA’s power to achieve industrial peace.96
Again, the point can be generalized. Sometimes the way in which an agency
enforces constitutional rights will inhibit its ability to achieve the goals set out in its
organic statute.97 That reduction in effectiveness might also be unnecessary where
other institutions can provide effective remedies for the constitutional violation.98
Administrative constitutionalism might be problematic when agency constitutional
interpretations (a) unnecessarily (b) weaken the effectiveness of the statutes the
agency administers.
More remedies for judicially defined constitutional violations might not always
be better. Further, though Professor Meltzer did not make this point, remedial overenforcement might lead to the other forms of “over”-enforcement already discussed.99
Agencies that build attention to constitutional rights into their missions might experience “mission creep,” an expansion of the mission beyond its initial scope.100
Beginning with the view that the agency should use the tools at hand to address
violations of constitutional rights as the court define such violations, the agency comes
to take its own view of what the Constitution requires. Sometimes, as the literature
on administrative constitutionalism argues, doing so can contribute to changes in
judicial doctrine.101 This would occur, for example, if the agency extended judicial
doctrine to deal with problems that the courts had not yet considered. Where the
agency’s interpretation is ruled out by clear judicial precedent, we once again have
the standard version of “over”-enforcement.102
Professor Meltzer’s argument rested upon a close analysis of the precise statutory
context in which the NLRB operated.103 Its conclusion was that administrative constitutionalism in that setting was problematic.104 The generalization of that argument here
devotes no attention to statutory specifics. For that reason, the general conclusion
should be that sometimes—but only sometimes—administrative constitutionalism
can be problematic because better ways of operating a complex system for protecting constitutional rights are available.
95

See id. at 45–46.
Id. at 25.
97
See, e.g., id. at 32.
98
See, e.g., id. at 25.
99
I drop the scare quotes in the first use of over-enforcement in this sentence to indicate that
the agency is not disagreeing with judicial definitions of the applicable constitutional provision.
100
See Dov Fox, Interest Creep, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 276 (2014) (explaining the
origin and meaning of the phrase “mission creep”).
101
See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
102
See supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.
103
See Meltzer, supra note 15, at 1–6.
104
See id. at 45–46.
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CONCLUSION
That Presidents can “over”- and “under”-enforce individual rights is obvious.105
The problems with “under”-enforcement seem equally obvious, but, as I have argued,
much depends upon one’s views about the value of taking judicial specifications of
those rights as the normative baseline.106 If one is agnostic on that question, sometimes presidential “under”-enforcement will be desirable.
One problem with presidential “over”-enforcement is also reasonably obvious.
This problem arises when the President’s approach to one individual right raises
questions about incursions on other individual rights. Another problem is subtler.
It arises not only when Presidents “over”-enforce relative to a judicial baseline but
also when the President follows that baseline to the letter.107 Sometimes, as Professor
Meltzer argued, doing so can reduce the President’s ability to implement nonconstitutional statutory goals without improving the actual protection of individual rights.108
Sometimes, that is, less presidential enforcement of individual rights actually protects
those rights more effectively than does more enforcement.
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See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
See Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism About Normative Constitutional Advice, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1473, 1477 (2008).
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See supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.
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See Meltzer, supra note 15, at 45–46.
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